

European Militarism

–

At What Cost?

*Niamh Ní Bhriain, Transnational
Institute*

Let's go back to the start

- From the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Union
- Schumann Declaration 1950
- ‘ World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it’
- ‘ To make war not only merely unthinkable but materially impossible’

Fast forward a few decades

....

- The Treaty of Lisbon – 2009
- Common Security and Defence Policy
- Strategic Compass
- European Defence Agency
- ...
- Far from making war materially impossible the arms industry was placed centre stage


Priorities, priorities, priorities ...

- From the 2014 - 2021 budget to the 2021 - 2027 budget there was a 123% budgetary increase in defence spending (€19.7 billion to €43.9 billion)
- By comparison the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme increased by 124% to €1.4 billion


Percentage change (Budget increase / decrease from 2014–2020 to 2021–2027)



An overview of defence budgets



A new point of departure – The EU begins funding the research and development of armament



GROUP OF PERSONALITIES

Of the 16 GoP members, six represented arms companies, namely Airbus, BAE Systems, Indra, Leonardo, MBDA, and Saab, two represented arms research institutes, Fraunhofer and TNO, and one represented the arms industry lobby organisation, AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD).

LARGEST BENEFICIARIES OF PADR AND EDIDP FUNDING (IN MILLIONS OF EUROS)



All the companies participating in the GoP combined received over €86 million, or 30.7% of the allocated funds, and the 15 largest beneficiaries got over 59% of the funding.

FANNING THE FLAMES

How the European Union is fuelling a new arms race

CORRUPTION

Of the eight largest beneficiaries – which account for 45% of PADR and EDIDP funding – five have had substantial corruption allegations levelled against them or associated companies.



LEONARDO



SAFRAN

AIRBUS



SAAB

THALES

FANNING THE FLAMES

How the European Union is fuelling a new arms race

From sending weapons to war zones to indirectly funding nuclear weapons.

CASE STUDY ONE: YEMEN WAR

Since the war in Yemen began in 2015 much of the debate regarding EU arms exports has centred on that country. Peace activists and human rights groups have called for an EU arms embargo on Saudi Arabia, which has led the military intervention in Yemen, and other involved parties, such as the UAE and Egypt. The European Parliament has also called for an arms embargo on several occasions, but decisions about such matters can only be taken by the member states in the Council and not at parliamentary level. After the enforced disappearance and murder of the Saudi journalist, Jamal Kashoggi, in October 2018, inside the Saudi embassy in Turkey, several member states finally placed restrictions on arms exports to Saudi Arabia, including Germany, Italy and Sweden.¹¹¹

Even so, most of the companies profiled above have supplied arms to one or more of the warring parties, which have been deployed in the war, such as Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets manufactured by a consortium including Airbus and Leonardo. These planes are equipped with missiles from MBDA, which is co-owned by the same companies, and targeting devices supplied by Thales.¹¹² The continuing war did not prevent a deal between Saab and the UAE for the delivery of two Erieye Airborne Early Warning and Control systems, or a new cooperation agreement between Hensoldt and Saudi Arabia's Intra Defence Technologies for the development of airborne surveillance and targeting systems.¹¹³

Yemen is not the only country of concern in the region. Turkey, with its authoritarian and repressive government, attacks on the Kurdish population, tensions with neighbouring countries and involvement in the wars in Yemen and Libya, is also a client for most of the companies.¹¹⁴

The examples of Yemen and Turkey, where European manufactured weapons have continued to pour in to these volatile environments in recent years serve as a reminder that military equipment funded by the EU does not bring about stability or safety, it only further fuels war, destruction and displacement, and props up authoritarian regimes.

CASE STUDY TWO: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Many of the arms companies in receipt of European funding are also involved in the production of nuclear weapons. While Europe may not be directly funding the creation of a nuclear arsenal, it is most definitely funding companies trading in nuclear armament.

Biological and chemical weapons have long been outlawed and the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in January 2021 added nuclear weapons to this list of banned weapons. In reality though, none of the nuclear states, including NATO members, is yet a signatory, of the nuclear treaty rendering the ban ineffective until they are.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, corporate involvement in working on nuclear weapons is increasingly unacceptable, and a growing number of (major) financial institutions has excluded or restricted investments in nuclear weapons companies.¹¹⁶ Nonetheless, four of the eight largest beneficiaries of PADR and EDIDP funding – Airbus, Leonardo, Safran and Thales – are involved in the development, production and/or maintenance of nuclear weapons. For instance, all are directly, or via subsidiaries or joint ventures, working on the maintenance and/or renewal of French nuclear weapons.¹¹⁷ Like other nuclear powers, France is modernising its nuclear arsenal, the core of which is the development and commissioning of new types of weapons, which, for example, due to a smaller explosive charge or a more precise operating system, are seen as having a more practical use in warfare.¹¹⁸ This feeds the illusion that a more reduced, lower-intensity type of nuclear warfare could be envisaged and could or should be explored as a way to incorporate nuclear weapons into conventional war. This significantly lowers the threshold for their deployment and flies in the face of the 2021 Treaty.


The involvement of many of the largest beneficiaries of the PADR and EDIDP funding in arms exports to controversial destinations and in work related to nuclear weapons should raise questions about who and what the EU is actually financing, especially since one of the main objectives of these funds, and of the EDF, is to strengthen the competitiveness of the EU arms industry and hence to stimulate arms exports.

Smart weapons and transparency gaps

TECHNOLOGIES ADDRESSED IN PADR AND EDIP PROJECTS


The development/use of unmanned systems are included in only 12 projects (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Use of unmanned systems



The use of AI in the projects is not as widespread as might have been expected but it is still of concern that it is being funded taking in to account the points raised in the previous chapter.

Figure 3. Use of AI techniques



CR build on PADR templates: Ethics CR/EA V9 - 03.11.2017

ETHICS ASSESSMENT
CONSENSUS REPORT (CR)

Programme: Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR)
Call for proposals: Strategic Technology Research (STRAT-STR)

Topic: **STRAT-STR-2017-1** - The European Defence Research Forum
Type of action: Coordinator and Support Action (CSA)
Call deadline: 21/09/2017

Proposal: [REDACTED]

Date of ethics assessment: between 30.10.2017 and 03.11.2017

Ethics reviewers:

| Name (and role, if other than evaluator) | Role | Signature |
|--|-------------|------------|
| [REDACTED] | ELSA Expert | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | ELSA Expert | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | ELSA Expert | [REDACTED] |

Proposal data:

Duration (months): 18

Applicants:

[REDACTED]

Project abstract:

[REDACTED]

CR build on PADR templates: Ethics CR/EA V2 - 03.11.2017

ETHICS ASSESSMENT
CONSENSUS REPORT (CR)

Programme: Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR)
Call for proposals: Strategic Technology Research (STRAT-STR)

Topic: **STRAT-STR-2017-1** - The European Defence Research Forum
Type of action: Coordinator and Support Action (CSA)
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Project abstract:

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
Table 2. Ethical issues relating to research and development

| Ethical Issues | Yes | No |
|---|-----|----|
| Humans Does this research involve human participants? | 4 | 0 |
| Protection of personal data Does this research involve personal data collection and/or processing | 5 | 0 |
| Environmental protection and safety Does this research involve the use of elements that may harm to the environment, to animals, or plants? | 4 | 0 |
| Misuse Does this research have the potential for malevolent/ criminal /terrorist abuse? | 4 | 0 |
| Other ethics issues Are there any other ethics issues that should be taken into consideration? | 4 | 0 |
| Ethics Checks An Ethics Check should be conducted. The Check should verify that adequate measures as mentioned above have been implemented? | 4 | 0 |

Beyond Europe, what's happening globally?

World Military Expenditure 2021


Source: SIPRI, Military expenditure database



SMOKE SCREEN: How states are using the war in Ukraine to drive a new arms race

Stop
Wapenhandel

Arms production on steroids



How is this justified by political leaders?

A SNAPSHOT OF STATEMENTS MADE BY KEY PUBLIC FIGURES TO JUSTIFY MILITARY SPENDING INCREASES

According to the European Commission, by mid-May 2022, EU member states had announced a total of almost €200 billion in increased military spending in the coming years.²¹

For the most part, there was little public, media or parliamentary discussion or scrutiny regarding the proposed increases to military expenditure. A general argument was that increased expenditure was necessary in light of the 'Russian threat', coupled with fear-mongering commentary about years of cuts and underspending.

'We have to ask ourselves, therefore, what capabilities does Putin's Russia have, and what capabilities do we need to counter this threat, today and in the future? One thing is clear: We must invest significantly more in the security of our country in order to protect our freedom and our democracy.'


– German Chancellor Olaf Scholz²²

'Today's threat from Russia is an incentive to invest more in defence than we have ever done before.'

– Former Italian Prime Minister Draghi²³

'The brutal Russian war of aggression in Ukraine vividly shows why we need to urgently strengthen European defence, and also why defence innovation is essential.'

– European Commission High Representative Borrell²⁴



'Europe must now accept the price for peace, freedom and democracy.'

– French President Macron²⁵

'Maintaining our technological edge has helped to keep our Alliance strong and our nations safe for more than seventy years. But today, nations that do not share our values, like Russia and China, are challenging that lead. In everything from Artificial Intelligence to space technologies. It is essential that we do everything in our power to remain at the forefront of innovation and technology.'

– NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg²⁶

'Putin's invasion of Ukraine did not dramatically change the Lithuanian defence policy course. It only has proved that we are on the right track ...It is important to work closely with the defence industry so that demands would be met in time.'

– Lithuanian Minister of National Defence, Arvydas Anušauskas²⁷

There was little mention of the fact that this additional commitment would centre on NATO and EU countries, who are already spending far more on defence than Russia and are already significantly over-armed. This fact was either ignored or viewed as irrelevant in public debate.

While the mainstream media (MSM) seemed to take as a foregone conclusion European support for increased militarism, the level of support across Europe for more defence spending and supplying arms and know-how to Ukraine, a pan-European opinion poll conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations found that while European citizens express 'overwhelming solidarity with the Ukrainian people, there were deep divisions on how Europe should respond'. It found substantial public support for boosting military expenditure only in Finland, Germany, Poland and Sweden, four of the ten countries surveyed.²⁸



Back to priorities ... what about military spending and climate?



Where does militarism intersect with climate breakdown?

- The military is a significant emitter of GHG though it was exempt from the Paris Agreement
- States are already framing climate breakdown as a national security issue and thus one that will be dealt with militarily
- Fossil fuel companies, who are among the highest emitters of GHGs are often protected by militarised security agencies
- The richest countries who are most responsible for the climate crisis are spending much more on boosting their military might than on hitting the UN climate finance targets
- Reframing of the military as 'greener and leaner' and a necessary player in guaranteeing a more sustainable planet

5 per cent cut in annual military spending by the top 10 spenders would pay global climate adaptation costs for low and middle-income countries




Source: SIPRI, UNEP

CLIMATE COLLATERAL
How military spending accelerates climate breakdown

www.tni.org/climatecollateral

The richest countries are exporting arms rather than aid

The richest countries export to all 40 of the world's most climate vulnerable countries



- Climate vulnerable countries that receive arms
- Most important arms suppliers

Source: SIPRI, ND-GAIN

CLIMATE COLLATERAL

How military spending accelerates climate breakdown

www.tni.org/climatecollateral

GHG and Military Spending

| TABLE 1. Historical emissions of largest emitters compared with global military spending (2013–2021) | | | | |
|--|----------------|-------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| Rank in GHG emissions ⁵ | Country | GHG emissions (%) | Military spending (in \$ billions 2013–2021) | Rank in military spending (2013–2021) |
| 1 | United States | 33.3 | 6,243.36 | 1 |
| 2 | China | 11.7 | 1,975.89 | 2 |
| 3 | Russia | 5.8 | 630.06 | 3 |
| 4 | Germany | 4.8 | 413.80 | 9 |
| 5 | Japan | 4.3 | 435.16 | 8 |
| 6 | United Kingdom | 4.2 | 537.36 | 6 |
| 7 | Canada | 2.6 | 189.21 | 14 |
| 8 | France | 2.5 | 458.27 | 7 |
| 9 | Australia | 1.9 | 240.70 | 12 |
| 10 | Brazil | 1.8 | 236.50 | 13 |
| Others | | | | |
| 13–14 | Saudi Arabia | 1.3 | 629.14 | 4 |
| 13–14 | South Korea | 1.3 | 367.20 | 10 |
| 25–29 | India | 0.5 | 558.07 | 5 |

Sources: Climate Equity Calculator, SIPRI military expenditure database

Climate Finance v Military Spending

Climate finance versus military spending

Because of the lag and some other gaps in reporting on climate finance, it is difficult to compare it with military spending for the whole of the period since 2013. Based on officially reported climate finance, military spending by Annex II countries on average was 14.9 times as high. There is no clear trend regarding this ratio, but for 2017 to 2020 it has fluctuated between 13 and 14 times.

**TABLE 3. Reported climate finance versus military spending by Annex II countries (2013–2020)
in \$ billion**

| | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Total* |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------|-------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Military spending | 1,038.9 | 1,006.7 | 948.7 | 961.8 | 981.1 | 1,040.0 | 1,094.1 | 1,159.3 | 7,281.9 |
| Reported climate finance | 52.4 | 61.8 | n/a | 58.5 | 71.6 | 79.9 | 80.4 | 83.3 | 487.9 |
| Ratio | 19.8:1 | 16.3:1 | n/a | 16.4:1 | 13.7:1 | 13.0:1 | 13.6:1 | 13.9:1 | 14.9:1 |
| Estimated real climate finance** | 26.2 | 30.9 | n/a | 29.3 | 35.8 | 39.9 | 40.2 | 41.6 | 243.9 |
| Ratio | 39.7:1 | 32.6:1 | n/a | 32.8:1 | 27.4:1 | 26.1:1 | 27.2:1 | 27.9:1 | 29.9:1 |

* 2015 not included – sources: OECD, SIPRI, Oxfam International

** Based on average of 50%